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The Philippine Congress and The Political Order

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The relationship between the Philippine Congress and the political order was shaped by the interplay of historical forces in Philippine society and the development of other political institutions — the Presidency, the party system, local government, etc. Among others, this may be seen in the politics of urban reform, particularly in the case of Metropolitan Manila's problems. Legislators' preoccupation with traditional clientelist politics led to the declining performance and prestige of Congress and thus contributed to the political discontent in the late 1960s and the imposition of Martial Law in 1972. The latter spelled the dissolution of Congress as it hastened the process of constitutional change.

Introduction

This paper analyzes the role of the Philippine Congress in maintaining the political order from 1946 to 1972 in the context of: (1) the influence of the environment on the political process in general and on the power structure in Congress in particular, and its functioning as the national legislature which must respond to socio-economic and political demands; (2) the powers of Congress and its relations with the President; (3) the policy outputs of Congress regarding the Philippine economy and society; and (4) the impact of Congress on the functioning of the political process, i.e., its effectiveness in maintaining the political order and mediating political, social change, and economic development. Such an analysis entails an examination of the history of Philippine elections and the party system; how these shaped and reinforced the dominance of the traditional landed elite in the colonial and postwar economy and politics; and how this dominance conditioned the res-

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ponse of Congress to socioeconomic demands as articulated by interest groups and individuals in the political process and affected the relations between congress and the President. The interactions between Congress and its external environment, i.e., Philippine society, the Presidency, the party system, local government, etc., will be examined by focusing on the politics of urban reform, in particular the case of Metropolitan Manila's reorganization.

Historical Evolution of the Philippine Congress

The Philippine Congress had its origins as the colonial legislature during the American regime.[1] Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Cooper Act), enacted by the United States Congress, Filipinos were given representation in the lower chamber of the legislature, the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Commission, which was initially composed entirely of Americans appointed by the US President, served as the upper chamber as well as the Executive Branch of the colonial government.[2] Members of the Philippine Assembly were apportioned among the 34 regularly organized provinces according to population with each province having at least one representative. Manila was treated as a province for purposes of representation. The Assemblyman were elected to serve for a term of two years. This was changed to four years in 1911 by an Act of the US Congress.

The first elections to the Philippine Assembly took place in 1907, with 80 representatives chosen by qualified electors. Members of the Assembly elected from among themselves a presiding officer, the Speaker, who thus became the highest elective Filipino official in the colonial government, second only to the American Governor General in power and influence.

In 1916, the colonical legislature was completely Filipinized. Under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law), a 24-member Senate replaced the Philippine Commission as the upper chamber and a House of Representatives replaced the Philippine Assembly as the lower chamber. The Senators were apportioned equally among 12 senatorial districts. Except for two who represented the twelfth district composed of non-Christian provinces, Senators were chosen by qualified electors for a term of six years. The House of Representatives was composed of 90 members who, except for nine Representatives from the non-Christian areas, were elected for a term of three years. Senators and Representatives from the non-Christian provinces were appointed by the Governor-General and held office at his pleasure.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the bicameral legislature was replaced by a unicameral National Assembly whose members were to be elected for a term of four years. In 1940, the Constitution was amended to restore the bicameral legislature — the congress composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. This change remained in force until 1972.

The Colonial Legislature and the Political Order

The functioning of the Philippine legislature during the colonial era was greatly affected by the nature of its membership as well as by the relations between the Philippine political elite and the American colonial authorities. Its members came largely from the traditional landed elite which also dominated colonial economy and politics. This elite dominance was the product of the socio-economic structure and the evolution of the country's electoral system which helped to shape the kind of parties that developed.

The first elections held in 1902 were for municipal positions. Under the Municipal Code of 1901, suffrage was restricted to males who were at least 23 years old, who were literate in English or Spanish, who held municipal office before August 13, 1898 and who owned real property worth at least US$250 or paid an annual tax of US$15.[3] Thus only the educated members of the traditional elite i.e., the *illustrados* or *principalia*, were qualified to participate in the early elections. Consequently, factional rivalries and personality issues among the local influential families predominated in the electoral contests.

When the first national election was called in 1906 to select the representatives to the first Philippine Assembly, local elite factions rallied their support behind leaders of the Manila-based national party organizations on the basis of friendship, kinship ties (consanguinity, affinity or ritual kinship, i.e., *compadrazgo*), regional and other particularistic considerations.[4] The party organization that thus developed was based on a loose coalition of national, regional and local elites and their followers, bound by patron-client relations rather than adherence to common political beliefs or principles. Reciprocity and clientelist relations gave rise to short-term pragmatic, bargaining approach to politics. Clientelist politics were essentially built on a rural, quasi-feudal, dependent electorate, amidst inequality of income and status, illiteracy and a concentration of political and economic power in a narrow upper class — factors that were themselves produced by the country's history of underdevelopment. The small number of qualified participants in the initial electoral process (104,966 or 1.15 percent of the total population in 1907)[5] as a result of the restrictive voting qualifications, undoubtedly contributed profoundly in entrenching clientelist politics. Long after the restrictive property and literacy qualifications for suffrage had been withdrawn in 1935,[6] the old landed elite continued to dominate party politics even as their domination would later run into accumulating contradictions.

The elite enjoyed economic and political privileges, acting as brokers between American colonial officials and the Filipino masses while advancing their own class interests. This explains the absence of ideological and programmatic differences among the major parties. The first political party organized on December 23, 1900 was the *Partido Federalista*. It advocated the country's annexation to the United States. Its members came from the educated Filipinos, the *illustrados*, who enjoyed preference for appointment to the civil service and won all local elections until 1907. The *Partido Nacio-*

nalista, having as its goal Philippine independence, was founded in 1901. American authorities, however, refused to give it legal recognition because of its leadership links with the newly organized labor union in Manila, the *Union Obrera*.[7]

The announcement in 1906 of national elections for the Philippine Assembly led to the organization of other political parties. On March 12, 1907, several parties merged to form the *Partido Nacionalista* in Manila under the leadership of middle and upper class politicians. This time the new party had no links with labor unions. Its platform of immediate Philippine independence assured it of popular support, which lasted throughout the American regime. The *Partido Federalista* was also reorganized into the *Partido Progresista*, with gradual independence as its goal.

Because local elections had preceded elections for the Philippine Assembly, political parties were organized around alliances of provincial and municipal elite and their following. Electoral campaigns centered around personalities rather than on social and economic issues or problems. In 1907, the Nacionalista won control over the Philippine Assembly and since then effectively directed colonial politics. During most of the American regime, the Nacionalista Party (NP) was effectively the only political party. It was periodically split formally into two rival factions, led by Quezon and Osmeña, which contested national elections. After elections, the rivalries were set aside and the party reunited.[8] The final schism in the NP came during the 1946 elections for the independent Republic and led to the formation of the two major parties in subsequent elections — the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party.

The predominance of the Nacionalista Party throughout the American regime was due to the ability of its leaders to skillfully exploit the independence issue and co-opt most of the potential national leaders into the party. The NP cooperated closely with the Americans and effectively used party patronage, electoral machinery, funds and prestige to gain popular support.[9] Party dominance may be seen in the 1907 Philippine Assembly where Nacionalistas held 59 seats (72 percent). In 1916, the Nacionalistas held 75 seats (83.3 percent) in the House of Representatives; in the Senate, 21 of 22 elected Senators were Nacionalistas and one of two appointed Senators was a Nacionalista.[10] The social class background of the legislators may be inferred from their reported profession or occupation. In 1916, 37 out of 90 members of the House of Representatives were lawyers; 12 were lawyer/agriculturists or lawyer/businessmen; 17 were agriculturists/landowners/businessmen; five were physicians and the remaining 29 were businessmen/entrepreneurs, newspapermen, former civil servants, teachers and notaries. In the Senate, lawyers also predominated with nine out of 22 members belonging to this profession; another eight were lawyer/newspapermen or lawyer/agriculturists; two were physicians and three were landowners.[11]

Given the dominance of one party and hence of the upper class which controlled it, the problems of land ownership, tenancy, labor, urban and rural poverty could not be tackled by the American authorities without losing Nacionalista support and cooperation. The Americans had intended the public school system as a means to gradually bring about socio-economic equality in the Philippines and counteract the influence of the traditional elite. But as a Filipino historian puts it:

> the policy was a glaring display of naivete. The American policy of free trade further entrenched the Filipino elite in Philippine society, just as it also dictated that Philippine economic development should take place mainly among agricultural lines.[12]

Because of NP and upper class control over colonial politics and administration, newcomers to the political process such as labor and agrarian groups, and lower urban and rural classes, could not be readily absorbed into the system. The gap between the social classes widened. The upper class in Manila and its suburbs, in provincial capitals and in other cities, had standards of living which Hayden described (during the Commonwealth era, 1935 to 1940) as comparable to those of "well-to-do Americans." They were united by a common language — Spanish or English, a common educational background, frequent visits to, or prolonged residence in Manila, and membership in the political parties. They shared similar interests and political goals. In contrast, the vast majority of the Filipinos were still living in poverty as urban or rural laborers. They were divided by parochial and regional interests, diverse languages, illiteracy, rural or urban occupations and residence. They remained dependent on the rich, educated and politically dominant class. A prominent Filipino at that time observed:

> Our local legislators have become independent of the ordinary means of living. They are sort of divorced from the common suffering of the masses. In other words, they are out of contact with the people they are supposed to represent.[13]

In Manila itself, however, the presence of organized workers, a relatively literate population, poverty and a tradition of politicization predisposed electoral support for socialist minority parties such as, for example, the Socialist Party, the *Partido Sakdalista* and *Partido Radical*. The city's governmental structure, where the Mayor was appointed by the Governor General and the Municipal Board (or council) members were popularly elected, led to frequent conflict between the Board and the Insular Government. Moreover, since the Municipal Board was dominated by minority parties, it was often in opposition to the Nacionalista-controlled Philippine legislature.[14]

The failure of the unrepresented groups in the Philippines to effect basic socio-economic legislation, through their exercise of suffrage, drove them to violence during the American regime. This was particularly true in Manila where urban workers were vulnerable to the economic vicissitudes of the world market. They organized more labor unions as soon as the sedition law was lifted in 1906. Government recognition of the Nacionalista Party

and the latter's victory in the 1907 elections, however, dealt a serious blow to the labor union as the nationalist support that had formerly been channelled towards support for the unions now largely switched to support for the NP. Hence, the unions had very little impact on subsequent policy-making. Consequently, no serious reforms were undertaken to alleviate the growing poverty and discontent among Manila's masses, other urban centers and the rural areas. By the 1920s, social unrest was manifested in strikes in Manila and uprisings in the countryside. The worldwide economic depression up to the 1930s worsened living conditions of the population and led workers to join radical parties and organizations and resort to violence. The government reacted by nationalizing the police force. Deteriorating social conditions nurtured the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the 1930s and the *Partido Sakdalista*. The latter spearheaded a serious peasant uprising in Central and Southern Luzon in May 1935.[15]

On November 15, 1935, the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines was inaugurated. Filipinos were given control of their affairs except for national defense, foreign relations and the U.S. President's power to approve or disapprove constitutional amendments or acts affecting currency, coinage, imports or exports. Industrialization, which had been a conscious policy only during the term of Governor General Harrison from 1916 to 1919, was now given greater consideration. President Manuel L. Quezon's program of social justice resulted in some agrarian reform and labor legislation, and some new government enterprises were set up to promote industrial development. These policies were, however, countered by the continuing free trade relations with the United States which made the expansion and development of agricultural export crops much more profitable for the landed elite. This was the state of affairs when World War II broke out and the Philippines was occupied by the Japanese military forces.[16]

In summary, the Americans established a national legislature to prepare Filipinos for eventual self-government. In its formal structure and functions, the Philippine Legislature was representative and democratic. But seen in the context of the colonial government and the electoral system that developed, the legislature became an institution for the maintenance of the elite-dominated political order.

The net effect of the combined American policies in the Philippines was to widen still further the gap between the social classes and between the urban and rural areas. As an American historian summed it up:

> While the American administration and the Philippine political leaders quarreled, both neglected the unrepresented minorities — the needy classes consisting of urban laborers, tenant farmers, renters who rented land for a fixed sum rather than a share of the crop, and landless agricultural workers, who had no spokesman for their interests. Their poverty, ignorance, and superstition made them highly receptive to antigovernment propaganda.[17]

These historical forces in the political environment would continue to influence the functioning of the Congress during the independence era from 1946 to 1972.

The Philippine Congress: Structure, Powers and Functions

When the Philippines gained its independence in July 1946, Congress was already an institutionalized legislature. It was a bicameral body with a 24-member Senate as the upper house and a House of Representatives as the lower house. Eight senators were chosen at large every two years to serve for a term of six years. Members of the House of Representatives served for four years. They were apportioned among the provinces on the basis of population but each province was to have at least one representative. The Constitution fixed the maximum number of representatives at 120.[18] The actual number of representatives increased from 97 in 1946 to 108 in 1970. Although Congress was empowered to reapportion the legislative districts within three years after each national census, it enacted a redistricting bill only in 1961. The bill was approved by the President but was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.[19] Thus despite significant demographic changes, the apportionment of legislative districts, and hence the basis of representation in the lower house, remained the same since 1907. Consequently, rural areas tended to be over-represented throughout the 26 years of post-independence Congress.

Each chamber of Congress elected its own set of officers headed by a Senate President in the upper house and a Speaker in the House of Representatives. Each chamber also had an Electoral Tribunal composed was to be the sole judge of all the contests relating to elections, election returns, and qualifications of its members.[20]

The Constitution also mandated the creation of a Commission on Appointments to be composed of 12 Senators and 12 Representatives chosen by the members of each chamber on the basis of the proportional representation of political parties therein. The Senate President was the chairman *ex officio* of the Commission but could only vote in case of a tie.[21] The Commission was empowered to pass upon the appointments made by the President for heads of executive departments, bureaus, officers; officers of the Army from the rank of colonel and equivalent rank in the Navy and Air Force; ambassadors, ministers and consuls; justices of the Supreme Court and inferior courts and other positions provided by law.[22] The Commission on Appointments was to be organized within 30 days of the election of the Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Congress held regular sessions starting on the fourth Monday of January each year which lasted for 100 days. These sessions were generally open to the public. The president could call for special sessions to consider important measures but these sessions were limited to 30 days. Each chamber determined its own rules of procedure and the organization of its committees for the conduct of its business.

The number and size of standing committee in each chamber varied with each congressional election. In the House of Representatives, there were 51 standing committees in the First Congress (1946-49), decreasing to 30 in 1950-53. There were 35 standing committees in 1954-57 which increased to 43 from 1958 to 1969 and decreased to 27 during the Seventh Congress (1970-73). The minimum number of committee members ranged from six to nine while the maximum ranged from 17 to 36. It was inevitable, therefore, that committee memberships overlapped. On the average, a Representative was a member of six standing committees during the Sixth Congress (1965-69) and four standing committees during the Seventh Congress (1970-73). Moreover, there were also special investigative committees created from time to time. For example, during the Second Congress (1950-53), 12 such committees were created in the House of Representatives; four special committees were created during the Seventh Congress.

The problem of overlapping committee membership was even more serious in the Senate. For example, during the Third Congress (1954-57), there were 25 standing committees ranging in size from three to 12 members. In 1960-61, there were 27 standing committees ranging in size from five to 17 members. Considering that there were only 24 Senators and the fact that eight new Senators were elected every two years, problems of committee organization and functioning were bound to surface. Moreover, 12 Senators were also members of the bicameral Commission on Appointments which was itself further organized into 20 standing committees, corresponding to executive departments and other offices, to which the President's recommendations for appointments were referred.[23]

Congress was vested by the Constitution with several powers and functions. It was to formulate policies and enact laws and regulations governing the country. This included the power to enact revenue and tariff measures; to appropriate money for the functioning of the government; to create provinces, cities and municipalities; and to create and reorganize executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices and inferior courts. Congress was also given the sole power to declare war, by two-thirds vote of all its members. It had the power to initiate amendments to the Constitution by directly proposing amendments which must be submitted to a plebiscite for ratification or by calling for a Constitutional Convention which would take care of proposing amendments to be submitted to a plebiscite. In either case, Congress needed three-fourths vote of all its members to exercise this power.

Congress was also given certain powers vis-a-vis the judiciary and the executive in a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government. Aside from its power to confirm appointments made by the President, it shared in the power to direct or oversee public administration through its approval of the national budget and its power to conduct investigation or inquiries on government offices and officials in aid of legislation. This was made possible through the committee hearings and institution of the privilege hour and the privilege speech in each House where members of Congress used to "fiscalize" or criticize government officials and

agencies. Added to this was the power of the Senate to ratify treaties and agreements negotiated by the President by two-thirds vote of all its members. Finally, Congress was given the power to remove the President, Vice-President, justices of the Supreme Court, the Auditor General and other constitutional officials by impeachment. The House of Representatives could initiate impeachment by two-thirds vote of all its members while the Senate was given the power to hear impeachment cases and by three-fourths vote of its members could convict any official.

Implicit in all these enumerated formal powers was the representative function of Congress, i.e., its responsibility for ensuring that the policies, laws and conduct of government reflected the wishes and interests of the electorate and promoted the national welfare. In a sense the structure, powers and functions of Congress defined the formal roles of its members. These were the roles of representative, legislator or law-maker, "fiscalizer" or critic of the administration, and judge of the qualifications and conduct of its members and of other government officials. Yet the ability of Congress as a whole to effectively exercise its powers and functions and, hence, the ability of its members to satisfactorily perform their formal roles were greatly influenced by their environment, particularly the interplay of the electoral process, the party system and executive-legislative relations in the context of the changing socio-economic conditions. It is in this light that the environment and dynamics of policy-making and the record of Congress are examined.

Dynamics of Policy-Making and the Record of Congress

The nature of the party system and politics that evolved during the colonial period continued to underplay the formal functioning of Congress from 1946 to 1972. The pragmatic bargaining approach and reciprocity underlying clientelist politics ensured the accommodation of minority parties and diverse class, group and regional interests in the two party system and the continuation of democratic electoral processes in the Philippines after the American regime. In 1946, the *Huks* (People's Liberation Army), the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), National Peasant Union (PKM), Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), and several middle-class reform and nationalist organizations formed the Democratic Alliance (DA) to contest the first postwar national elections. Since the DA's mass base was limited to Central Luzon, Manila and Southern Luzon, it affiliated with the Nacionalista Party and supported President Sergio Osmeña. The latter was defeated and the Liberal-dominated Congress refused to seat six elected DA members in the House of Representatives, along with another Representative from Bulacan Province and three Nacionalista Senators, as part of the strategy to ensure the immediate adoption of the controversial parity rights provisions of the Bell Trade Act into the 1935 Philippine Constitution.[24] This incident, and the government's subsequent decision

to outlaw the Huks and PKM, set off the peasant rebellion in 1946 and drove the PKP and its affiliated organizations underground. Since that time, peasant, labor and nationalist groups have been weakly represented in the two major parties.

Electoral laws since 1947 institutionalized the two-party system by providing the two largest parties with election inspectors paid from national funds.[25] This favored the existing Liberal and Nacionalista parties, providing them with a built-in party apparatus. Such a scheme made it virtually impossible for alternative third parties to develop effectively.[26]

Leadership in major parties was determined by the dominant factions whose strength was partly based on the national offices they held as well as the size and resources of their personal followings. The absence of fundamental differences in party ideology and the clientelist basis of political support often resulted in electoral contests focused on personalities rather than on viable programs of government. It was not unusual for a politician to switch to the opposition party bringing along with him his own following and political and financial resources.[27] On the whole, national politicians relied heavily on the local elites for electoral support.[28]

Over the years, changing socioeconomic conditions resulted in the growth of a middle class of professionals and small businessmen, particularly in the urban areas; increased literacy; and the expansion of the electorate. These developments and continuing agrarian unrest brought about a gradual erosion of traditional clientelist loyalties and, consequently, more unstable political support.[29] Thus, more fluid patron-client relations resulted in more expensive elections as national politicians had to satisfy growing demands for material favors such as jobs, contributions for construction of roads, schoolbuildings, donations to charities and the like. Moreover, there was increasing use of mass media and modern transportation in the election campaigns, adding enormous costs for candidates.

Under these circumstances, incumbent officials became preoccupied with getting their share of political patronage and government funds to ensure their reelection. Those who belonged to the President's party (and his faction) enjoyed preferential access to these resources. Vested economic interests contributed to the campaign funds of probable winners in anticipation of future official favors such as government contracts, grant of business franchise and licenses, tax exemptions, changes in policy and others.[30] The escalating costs of elections increasingly dissipated national resources needed for capital formation and the expansion of essential government services for social and economic development,[31] as public revenues were disbursed on what may have been economically and socially unsound priorities but necessary for vote-getting.

These trends reinforced the political power of an increasingly narrow elite, preventing the adoption of long-run policies to restructure Philippine economy and society in ways that would have sustained its democratic form

of government. This was particularly evident in Congress. A study in 1963, for example, revealed that thrice as many Senators and twice as many Representatives belonged to the "upper class" compared to their fathers.[32] More recent data on the family background of legislators suggest that the number who came from wealthy families had increased considerably: from 21.5 percent in 1946 to 50.9 percent in 1970 in the House of Representatives; and from 45.8 percent in 1946 to 71.0 percent in 1970 in the Senate. This was paralleled by a corresponding decrease in those coming from families with moderate or limited resources.[33]

The continuity of the elite in Congress may further be seen in the number of reelectionists in the House of Representatives from 1946 to 1972. The data show (see Table 1) that the number of Representatives who were elected for the first time had decreased from 67 percent in 1946 to 42.6 percent in 1970. Since 1958, majority of the members of the House of Representatives had served for at least two terms, with a number of them having served in the House continuously since the colonial Philippine Legislature. A similar trend can be seen in the Senate (see Tables 2 and 3). Although more than half of the Senators (56.5 percent in 1954; 62.5 percent in 1958; 58.3 percent in 1966; and 54.2 percent in 1970) were elected for the first time to the upper chamber, a large number of them had in fact previously served in the House of Representatives (65.2 percent in 1954; 58.3 percent in 1958; 45.8 percent in 1966 and 50.0 percent in 1970). Moreover, some of the Senators had previously been elected as provincial governors or had served as members of the Cabinet.

While it may be argued that the continuity of membership in both houses of Congress undoubtedly contributed to the professionalization of legislators and, hence, aided or facilitated the functioning of Congress, the narrow social base from which Congressmen were recruited had profound consequences for substantive policy-making. As Congress remained dominated by rural-based landed interests, and because of the clientelist nature of politics, it became preoccupied with local bills or particularistic legislation.[34] Hence it failed to pass necessary legislation recommended by the President such as tax laws which were needed to provide capital for national industrial and agrarian reforms.[35]

A study of the nature of legislation from 1946 to 1970 showed that industry and agriculture, which are central to the process of development received very little attention in Congress. Bills passed by Congress regarding agriculture constituted only 1.1 percent of the total in 1946; 5.7 percent in 1954; 4.7 percent in 1962 and none in 1970. Bills on industry made up 8.7 percent of all bills in 1946, declining to 8.4 percent in 1954; 1.6 percent in 1962 and 1.9 percent in 1970.[36]

The industrialization policies adopted by Congress tended to be highly protectionist. The industries that developed were thus inward-looking and of the "import-dependent import-substitution type." These tended to be concentrated in and around Manila owing to its centrality of location, its

Table 1. Number of Terms Served By Members of House of Representatives, 1946 to 1970

No. of Terms Served in the Legislature*	Distribution of Representatives**													
	1946		1950		1954		1958		1962		1966		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One term	65	67.0	63	63.0	53	52.0	45	44.1	34	32.7	44	42.7	46	42.6
Two terms	16	16.5	22	22.0	31	30.4	31	30.4	22	21.2	21	20.4	27	25.0
Three terms	8	8.2	6	6.0	9	8.8	15	14.7	25	24.0	13	12.6	9	8.3
Four terms	2	2.1	5	5.0	3	2.9	3	2.9	12	11.5	14	13.6	11	10.2
Five terms	3	3.1	1	1.0	2	2.0	4	3.9	4	3.8	7	6.8	8	7.4
Six terms	2	2.1	1	1.0	2	2.0	2	2.0	4	3.8	2	1.9	3	2.8
Seven or more terms	1	1.0	2	2.0	2	2.0	2	2.0	3	3.0	2	1.9	4	3.9
Total	97	100.0	100	100.0	102	100.0	102	100.0	104	100.0	103	100.0	108	100.0

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Congress, Official Directory of the House of Representatives, First Congress (1946-1949) to Seventh Congress (1970-1973), (Manila: 1949 to 1971).

*Includes number of terms served under the colonial Philippine Legislature (1907 to 1935, a total of 10 terms) and under the Commonwealth Legislature (1935 to 1946, i.e. three terms).

**Details may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 2. Number of Terms Served By Senators 1954, 1958, 1966 and 1970

No. of Terms Served in Senate	Distribution of Senators*							
	1954		1958		1966		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One term	13	56.5	15	62.5	14	58.3	13	54.2
Two terms	5	21.7	3	12.5	6	25.0	6	25.0
Three terms	3	13.0	2	8.3	3	12.5	2	8.3
Four terms	1	4.3	4	16.7	1	4.2	3	12.5
Over four terms	1	4.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	23	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Congress, Official Directory of the Senate, Third Congress (1954-57), Fourth Congress (1958-61), Sixth Congress (1966-69) and Seventh Congress (1970-73)

*Details may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 3. Career Background of Members of the Senate
1954, 1958, 1966 and 1970

Work/Position Held Before Election	Distribution of Senators*							
	1954		1958		1966		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Appointed as Cabinet Member	5	21.7	2	8.3	4	16.7	2	8.3
Elected Local Government Official	1	4.3	1	4.3	1	4.3	3	12.5
Elected Member of House of Representatives	15	65.2	14	58.3	11	45.8	12	50.0
Other Work	2	8.7	7	29.2	8	33.3	7	29.2
Total	23	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Congress, Official Directory of the Senate, Third Congress (1954-57), Fourth Congress (1958-61), Sixth Congress (1966-69) and Seventh Congress (1970-73).

*Details may not add up to 100 due to rounding

port facilities and the availability of a large pool of both highly-skilled and unskilled manpower which could readily be employed by these firms.

Agricultural development was neglected by Congress with the result that the economy continued to rely on traditional exports — coconut, sugar, logs and others. This neglect was due to a number of interrelated historical, economic and political forces which had earlier been mentioned in this paper, i.e., the continuation of free trade and special relations with the United States under Bell Trade Act of 1946, the expulsion from Congress in 1946 of elected representatives supported by the Democratic Alliance (DA) of labor, peasant and nationalist organizations and the Communist Party (PKP); and clientelist politics which ensured the domination of the landed elite in the legislature. There was thus no effective pressure on Congress for agrarian reform. The consequent peasant rebellion led by the Huks and the PKP in Central Luzon from 1946 to 1956[37] and the election of Ramon Magsaysay as President in 1953 with overwhelming rural support finally forced Congress to enact some land reform measures. An agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199) and a Land Reform Act (Republic Act No. 1400) were passed in 1954 and 1955, respectively. Both Acts, however, were watered-down versions of the original proposals and did little to disturb existing land-tenure relationships. Nevertheless, they attested to Magsaysay's popular leadership and made the political elite more sensitive to probable peasant reactions to policies.[38]

The weakness of agrarian reform legislation during President Magsaysay's tenure showed the dominance and tenacity of the landed elite in Congress. The passage of some other laws, however, demonstrated that it was increasingly challenged by the growing middle class, led by urban-based professionals and elite. Competition for political support between this aspiring elite and the old ruling elite did lead to some consideration of economic reforms by Congress, such as, for example, the Retail Trade Nationalization Law in 1954.[39] Nevertheless, neither Magsaysay nor any of the subsequent presidents succeeded in securing congressional support for tax legislation that would have increased the low level of national revenues in relation to national income. The expansion of government services and investments which did occur was made possible largely through deficit spending. Magsaysay's tax reforms also met with limited success.[40]

The neglect of Congress of basic economic reforms aggravated the historically uneven development of the country, i.e., the underdevelopment of rural areas and the growth of a few urban areas especially Manila and its surroundings. Manila's urban growth and economic development, which had always been much faster than the rest of the country, was greatly accelerated by post-World War II rural to urban migration as people moved into the primate city in search of better economic opportunities and to get away from the growing rural unrest particularly in Central Luzon and other heavily tenanted areas. The massive influx of rural migrants into the city of Manila spilled over to its suburbs and affected several city and municipal governments which comprised the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMA).[41] This

brought about problems of acute urban congestion — slum dwelling, squatting, lack of health and sanitation facilities, unemployment, rising crime rate, inadequate police and fire protection, and others. Many of these problems cut across the traditional local government boundaries and their solution required integrated planning and concerted action in the area.[42]

The necessity of local government reform in MMA became critical because of Manila's historic role as national capital, commercial, religious, educational and cultural center. The MMA had also served as recruiting ground for national leaders. Many national officials in the past entered politics by seeking election in the city of Manila. This tended to enhance the city's influence in the national government. Although the formal structure of Philippine government is highly centralized, local officials in MMA, especially those from the city of Manila, had considerable leverage in political bargaining with national officials. Manila's dominance in the nation's political life and its large number of voters gave its Mayor ample bargaining power with the President.[43] The mayor's support for an incumbent President was considered crucial despite the latter's vast powers as the country's chief executive and titular head of his party.[44]

But despite Manila's political importance, the national government was unable to deal effectively with the mounting problems of the metropolitan area before 1972. This was due to a number of factors. Although elite residences, including those of national politicians were concentrated in Metropolitan Manila, the national elite was able to avoid Manila's urban problems as they transferred to well-serviced suburban residential enclaves after World War II. Moreover, while the national politicians in MMA had wealth and influence, the generally agricultural and feudal character of the society made them dependent on local rural politicians for electoral support. Another factor is that local governments in MMA, and urban areas in general, were underrepresented in Congress. Only the city of Manila had its own representatives in the lower House and, even then, there were only four of them. Thus any attempt to legislate metropolitan reform or a national urban policy was likely to fail for lack of political support in the legislature.

The relations between Congress and the President also determined the success or failure of the national government in dealing with the problems of Manila government. Under the constitutional separation of powers, Congress enacted laws, defined powers and functions of local government and appropriated national funds. The President approved or vetoed acts of Congress, supervised local governments, prepared the national budget and exercised other executive and administrative powers, including the appointment of national and local officials. Certain appointments required the consent of Congress' Commission on Appointments.

The solution to the mounting problems of MMA invariably involved executive-legislative relations on the issue of greater local autonomy and local taxing powers. During the Commonwealth era, President Quezon favored close central government supervision over local units and insisted

on appointing all city mayors "to reduce 'politicking' and ensure the selection of able administrators."[45] Because of Quezon's strong personality and his firm control over a virtually one-party legislature, he was able to secure the latter's support regarding limits to local government powers.

Succeeding presidents did not enjoy as much congressional support as Quezon. President Magsaysay campaigned for greater local autonomy but failed to secure the approval of his proposed legislation in 1956 and 1957.[46] Congress itself had an ambivalent position as regards local autonomy, confining this to the grant of powers to local units to elect their respective local executives and board or council members. In the creation of cities (i.e., the grant of charter to existing towns), which is the most elementary feature of urban policy, Congress did not follow uniform criteria. The reasons given by Congress for the creation of cities were varied and contradictory. In several instances, Congress granted city status to municipalities but in fact made the new units more dependent on the national government for financial support.[47] Even the much vaunted Local Autonomy Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2264), which was hailed as granting liberal taxing powers to local government, proved meaningless because Congress also enumerated a long list of taxes which local units were expressly forbidden to levy.[48] It was apparent that legislative support for greater local autonomy was motivated more the desire to please local officials and ensure their continued electoral support than to promote more effective and responsive local government.[49]

Local governments with few exceptions, generally depended on the national government for much of their financial needs and public services in their territories. An important source of funds was the annual Public Works Act enacted by Congress. This was the source of pork barrel which Congressmen used to obtain local electoral support.[50] Appropriations for this purpose increased each year, but had little positive long term impact on local infrastructure development, such as road and bridge building, floods control and the like, since the choice of projects was determined mainly by immediate vote-getting considerations rather than by rational administrative criteria such as priority needs, construction and maintenance costs and others. Moreover, since appropriations for Public Works Act often exceeded available government resources,[51] the President naturally used his discretion over the release of funds to aid or frustrate the reelection of particular politicians. Political bargaining between the President and Congress thus assured the continuance of electoral politics but failed to create consensus on the necessary basic national and local reforms. This persistent failure of Congress to respond to mounting problems eventually led to a political impasse by 1972.

On the whole, the policies enacted by Congress mainly benefitted the traditional landed elite in the Philippines. For example, Carroll's study noted that "the old economic elite . . . remains in proportion to its size, the most single fruitful source of manufacturing entrepreneurs".[52] Moreover, Simbulan's study showed that political and socioeconomic power in the Philip-

pines was concentrated in the same dominant families of the modern *principalia*. The political elite were not only decision-makers, they were also found to be landowners, bankers, shipping and land transportation magnates, owners of newspapers, television and radio stations, and even universities and colleges.[53] Because of this, the big exporters, importers, manufacturers and various landowning groups, such as for example, the sugar block and the tobacco block, often received protective legislation, liberal loans from government banks and other financing institutions, lucrative government contracts and appointments to key public offices and corporations.[54] This homegeneity of the socioeconomic and political elite explains the persistent conservatism of Congress in policy-making and its neglect of basic issues affecting national development.

The concentration of political and economic power in the national *principalia* further widened the gap between the elite and the masses. Although the middle class in both rural and urban areas grew, they did not succeed in developing effective means to match the economic weight of the national elite. Consequently, local elites remained dependent on the national elite for political patronage and financial support in elections. Elections thus became more expensive as the national elite had to spread their financial support for aspiring and incumbent local officials who would, in turn deliver votes for national candidates. To meet rising election costs, Congress increased Congressmen's salaries and allowances such that outlays for the latter accounted for approximately one-third of the annual investment outlays of the government.[55] The increase in Congressmen's allowances in the annual appropriations act had been frequently criticized by the press as a "congressional orgy" and in violation of the Constitution. But these allowances continued to rise despite the Auditor General's appeal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (in 1962) and the President (in 1963) to curb them.[56] Expenditures of Congress as a whole rose from ₱2.7 million in 1946 to ₱53.9 million in 1968. As a percentage of total government expenditures, this grew from 1.2 percent in 1946 to 1.8 percent in 1968.[57] At the same time, Congress did little to increase the national government's source of revenue through income or property tax reforms. Yet to meet the growing demands of the urban-based middle class and manufacturing entrepreneurs for loans and capital investment in order to develop the national economy, more revenue was essential.

Despite public criticism of Congress, its legislative output did not improve. The total number of bills passed by Congress (including those vetoed by the President) declined from 11.4 percent of the total number introduced in either chamber in 1946 to 1.7 percent in 1970 (see Table 4). From 1964 to 1971, it consistently failed to enact the national Appropriation Act during its 100-day regular session.[58] This resulted in "government agencies operating on a legally questionable budget authorized by the President through the Budget Commission" at the beginning of each fiscal year and created uncertainy in governmental planning and operations.[59] The

Table 4. Legislative Performance of Congress Selected Years, 1946 to 1970

Session Year	Bills Introduced			Bills Passed			Col. 7 as Per Cent of Col. 4	Resolutions Passed
	House	Senate*	Total	Enacted into Law	Vetoed	Total		
1946	783	49	832	95	0	95	11.4	45
1950	1,405	130	1,535	169	37	206	13.4	58
1954	2,558	171	2,729	230	12	242	8.7	46
1958	2,046	198	2,244	44	4	48	2.1	30
1962	3,289	320	3,609	61	10	71	2.0	12
1966	11,244	322	11,566	222	29	251	2.2	27
1970	2,580	569	3,149	49	4	53	1.7	48

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Congressional Record of the House of Representatives and the Senate, First to Seventh Congress, 1946 to 1970 (Manila: 1961-1971).

*The number of bills introduced in the Senate are actual figures for 1946, 1962 and 1970. For 1950, 1954, 1958 and 1966, figures represent annual average based on record of total bills introduced in the Senate for each four-year Congress

President called special sessions of Congress to secure approval of the national budget and other measures. There were 19 special sessions from 1964 to 1971, each estimated to have cost the government an additional ₱250,000 to ₱500,000.[60] It took Congress an average of 115 days to pass the budget act during the period, 30 days longer than the constitutionally prescribed time. Deliberations took longer during two national election years (1965 and 1969), as the opposition party carefully scrutinized appropriations for the "calamity" and "national security" funds for the Office of the President, which were suspected of being used for partisan political purposes.[61]

There were other factors which contributed to the declining legislative performance of Congress. The clientelist basis of politics resulted in members attending more to their role as patron than as legislator. Interviews with legislators in 1963, for example, showed that on a typical day, 71.4 percent of Representatives and 38.9 percent of Senators spent five or more hours attending to people visiting them in their offices. Only 46.8 percent of Representatives and 61.1 percent of Senators devoted more than half of their time on strictly legislative functions.[62] This was manifested in absenteeism, particularly in the House of Representatives, often resulting in a lack of quorum and adjournment of sessions.[63]

The legislative process was further eroded by the large number of standing committees, often with overlapping jurisdictions or memberships, and lengthy hearings to investigate government "anomalies" and individuals for "anti-Filipino" activities.[64] This was aggravated by the limited technical research staff and library facilities, resulting in hasty deliberations on economic and other critical measures. The House of Representatives did organize in 1968 a Congressional Economic Planning Office (CEPO) under the Office of the Speaker to undertake studies on problems relating to industrial policy, fiscal and monetary policies, international trade and the like, and to draw up for consideration by Congress long range policy plans for national and social development.[65] But as the CEPO did not really have a large permanent research staff, it depended on research assistance from private business organizations and individuals from the private sector, the universities and a number of higher civil servants who were tapped as technical consultants.

Because of the fragility of party alliances, much legislative time was also lost in political wrangles for dominant positions and the rivalry between the two houses which resulted in action in one house on bills emanating from the other. For example, in 1958, the fight for committee chairmanships in the Lower House delayed legislative business for 16 days as there were no organized committees to which bills could be referred. Similarly, the protracted contest for minority floor leadership in the Senate in 1960 took up 19 session days.[66] In 1962, the Speaker of the House of Representatives noted: "After three months of partisan strife, the Congressmen laid aside the factional bitterness and settled down to positive and concrete legislative work."[67] Complementing these were the numerous "privileged speeches of congressmen to "fiscalize" (i.e., criticize) the administration which held up

much legislative work. The predominance of lawyers among legislators (see Table 5 and 6) also predisposed them to give higher priority to debates on proposed amendments to the Constitution than to consideration of basic laws to tackle pressing economic and social problems.

The above discussion may explain the gradual decline in the power and prestige of Congress vis-a-vis the President and the general public. The mass media regularly featured the deliberations in Congress, creating widespread public cynicism over politics, infecting even the youth, particularly in the MMA.[68] In 1969, Congress passed a Joint Resolution "Establishing Basic Policies to Achieve Economic Development and Attain Social Justice." It recognized problems of poverty and income inequality but did not contain an anti-poverty program.[69] On the whole, the Resolution (which was popularly called the "Magna Carta of Social Justice and Economic Freedom") produced little, if any, change in Congressional legislative output.

While the efficacy of Congress declined, the President's power was enhanced. President Ferdinand E. Marcos was aware of the decreasing influence of traditional elites since independence as a result of repeated failures to fulfill their followers' expectations.[70] Hence, during his first term (1965-1969), he designed administrative and military channels to link his office more directly with the rural masses, thus lessening his dependence on Congressmen in securing electoral support. He created the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council (RCPCC) in 1966,[71] linking national agencies and local officials to handle the perennial rice shortage which had been an important factor in the failure of past presidents to get reelected. President Marcos also adopted a Four-Year Economic Program for the Philippines, Fiscal Years 1967-1970, which aimed at

> transforming the government institutions into more effective instruments for economic development and channelling a larger proportion of their resources into productive investments. In this regard, the challenge, among others, is to be able to convince politicians that good economic performance is better politics.[72]

The President mobilized the manpower and resources of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for action to complement civilian agencies in such activities as infrastructure construction; economic planning and program execution; regional and industrial site planning and development; community development and others.[73] He recruited more technocrats to form part of his Cabinet and staff the planning agencies he created. Many were relatively young, highly educated and had impressive technical and managerial experience. Drawn from the private sector, universities (particularly the University of the Philippines), and government agencies, several had administered private corporations and government offices. They emphasized the need to coordinate planning and administration of public programs and to promote "economy and efficiency" in government operations.[74] The public image they projected contributed to the resulting antipolitics climate of public opinion.

Table 5. Professional/Occupational Background of Members of the House of Representatives 1946 to 1970

Profession/ Occupation	Distribution of Representatives													
	1946		1950		1954		1958		1962		1966		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculturist/ Farmer	3	3.1	6	6.0	5	4.9	3	2.9	1	1.0	—	—	—	—
Businessman	7	7.2	4	4.0	7	6.9	6	5.9	10	9.6	14	13.6	22	20.4
Educator/Teacher	3	3.1	2	2.0	2	2.0	2	2.0	3	2.9	2	1.9	1	1.0
Engineer	6	6.2	6	6.0	5	4.9	3	2.9	3	2.9	6	5.8	6	5.6
Dentist	—	—	1	1.0	2	2.0	3	2.9	2	1.9	2	1.9	2	1.9
Physician	10	10.3	7	7.0	6	5.9	5	4.9	4	3.8	3	2.9	2	1.9
Lawyer	60	61.9	69	69.0	72	70.6	76	74.5	76	73.1	67	65.0	65	60.2
Former Military Officer	4	4.1	3	3.0	1	1.0	2	2.0	1	1.0	4	3.9	4	3.7
Scientist	2	2.1	—	—	2	2.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	—	—
Others	2	2.1	2	2.0	—	—	1	1.0	3	2.9	4	3.9	6	5.6
Total	97	100.0	100	100.0	102	100.0	102	100.0	104	100.0	103	100.0	108	100.0

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Official Directory of the House of Representatives, First Congress (1946-1949) to Seventh Congress (1970-73), (Manila: 1949 to 1971).

*Details may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 6. Professional/Occupational Background of Members of the Senate Selected Years

Profession/ Occupation	Distribution of Senators*							
	1954		1958		1966		1970	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculturist/ Farmer	—	—	2	8.3	—	—	—	—
Businessman	2	8.3	1	4.1	2	8.3	1	4.1
Educator/Teacher	1	4.1	—	—	3	12.5	3	12.5
Engineer	—	—	—	—	1	4.1	1	4.1
Physician	1	4.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lawyer	18	75.0	18	75.0	17	70.8	17	70.8
Former Military Officer	2	8.3	3	12.4	—	—	—	—
Others	—	—	—	—	1	4.1	2	6.3
Total	24	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0	24	100.0

Sources: Republic of the Philippines, Official Directory of the Senate, Third Congress, (1954-57), Fourth Congress (1958-61), Sixth Congress (1966-69) and Seventh Congress (1970-73).

*Details may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The employment of technocrats in key positions and the mobilization of the AFP for civic action resulted in the increasing functional integration of civilian and military elites. This integration and greater coordination of program planning and implementation produced remarkable achievements. For the first time, there was no rice shortage and the country even exported some by 1968.[75] As a consequence of the AFP's mobilization for civic action and the encouragement of private construction firms to invest in self-liquidating, tollfee road building, the Marcos administration surpassed the four-year record of its predecessors in infrastructure construction during its first 18 months in office.[76] In Metropolitan Manila, army engineers greatly aided in the construction of the Manila North Diversion Road and EDSA Highway linking Quezon City and other MMA units.

These achievements greatly increased the President's mass popularity. In addition, President Marcos personally distributed to every barrio captain their share of the ₱100 million appropriated by Congress for rural development and community improvement. His act bypassed "the customary distribution system through Congressmen or governors or mayors . . . to make it clear that the barrio captain need not have any other political loyalty.[77] The President also controlled the release of pork barrel funds to reward Congressmen. Hence, with escalating campaign costs, Congressmen seeking reelection became more dependent on the President for money and patronage. This dependence on the President, and continuing criticism by the mass media of a "do-nothing" and graft-ridden Congress, further weakened the legislature's credibility as critic of the national administation.

The high cost of elections was accompanied by increasing use of violence to influence voters.[78] The rising levels of electoral violence was used by the President as reason for more centralized control over local police forces and their modernization. In this connection, American assistance to the Philippine government for the training of metropolitan police and establishment of a national police communications network increased during the Marcos administration. The United States also provided military equipment, patrol cars, riot control weapons and gave Philippine forces extensive training in civic action.[79] American assistance was likewise extended to strengthen and modernize the bureaucracy with resident experts as advisers. These further enhanced the power of the executive vis-a-vis the legislative branch of the government.[80]

In 1969, there was a massive increase in government expenditures as Marcos intensified implementation of his infrastructure program and campaigned for reelection. His popularity and effective campaign machine resulted in his winning in all the country's regions and getting 60 percent of the votes cast. Moreover, 90 of the 110 Representatives elected belonged to his Nacionalista Party.[81] But the heavy election spending by both government and opposition drained the treasury and its foreign exchange reserves, greatly weakening the economy. This was immediately felt in Metropolitan Manila as inflation rapidly set in after elections. The President called for austerity measures before the end of the year.

The President's popularity in MMA declined drammatically in 1970. That year and 1971 were marked by the increasing number of protest rallies by students and many, often violent, demonstrations. These were directed at the President, Congress and the U.S. Embassy, over such issues as graft and corruption, government inaction on the deteriorating economy and continuing "neocolonialism" or "imperialism.[82]" The protest movement spread, fueled by economic hardships resulting from the devaluation of the peso in February 1970, contrary to the President's earlier campaign promise. The decision was made, on the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund, to satisfy the government's international creditors.[83] The student rallies in MMA were widely supported and covered by the mass media despite attempts by the President to win the latter's sympathy.[84] Workers, peasants and the urban middle class similarly staged demonstrations in MMA. In other parts of the country, particularly Central Luzon and Mindanao, there was increasing lawlessness, dissidence and social unrest. As the demand for political and economic reforms grew, the President finally called for legislation to convene a constitutional convention.

Deliberations on the proposed constitutional convention further revealed the impotence of Congress and its declining legitimacy. Congressmen tried to enact a law that would enable them to remain in office and still serve (if elected) in the convention. Only strong pressures from various sectors stopped the Congressmen's plan to directly control the drafting of a new Constitution. Congress thus provided for a constitutional convention elected on nonpartisan lines, with no candidacy to any individual unless he had been out of public office for at least two years prior to election.[85] The presence of student vigilance in the session halls, taking note of attendance and votes on bills, also forced Congressmen to be more attentive to their legislative duties.[86]

The Constitutional Convention met in June 1971 and the public debate it generated showed the various cleavages in Philippine society. The nationalist industrialists who had been prominent in the era of controls, renewed their campaign for Filipinization of the economy, and an end to free trade relations and parity rights for Americans after their termination in 1974. These demands were embodied in a report submitted to the Convention by Alejandro Lichauco, a delegate from Rizal province.[87]

The traditional exporters, such as the sugar and coconut producers, naturally pressed for an extension of free trade relations and continuation of the status quo. American business interests, represented by the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines (ACCP) argued for free enterprise, and campaigned against Filipinization of the economy as it would be "inimical" to the government's attempt to attract foreign investments. The ACCP's campaign was carried out in its *Journal* and was supported by the U.S. Embassy,[88] multinational corporations, some members of the Philippine business community and a segment of the urban middle class.[89]

These views and the Constitutional Convention debates were publicized by the mass media and greatly affected public opinion, as indicated by rallies and other protest activities from 1971 to 1972. It was well known that the Marcos administration was in favor of increased foreign investments as part of its economic development plans. This view was promoted by technocrats in the Executive Branch.

The government's position on foreign investments became an issue in the power struggle between President Marcos and the traditional ruling families, particularly the Lopezes. The latter were dominant members of the sugar bloc and had supported Marcos in his 1965 and 1969 elections. In fact, Fernando Lopez (as Marcos' running mate) was elected Vice-President and subsequently appointed as Secretary of Agriculture. In 1970, Lopez resigned from his Cabinet position due to the President's refusal to approve the Lopez family's proposed industrial complex project and joined the opposition to the Marcos administration.[90]

With mounting economic difficulties in 1971 and popular politicization, especially in Metropolitan Manila, the protest movement became increasingly radical/nationalist, anti-American and anti-elite. Support for the Marcos administration in the MMA continued to decline as growing urban violence grew. In August 1971, terrorists bombed a campaign rally of the opposition Liberal Party (LP) in downtown Manila, seriously injuring LP senatorial candidates and others. President Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus but this did not prevent further bombings nor result in the apprehension of terrorists. Public condemnation of the attack on the LP candidates undoubtedly contributed to the defeat of the President's party in the November 1971 elections. Six out of eight Senators elected were from the opposition Liberals.

The defeat of the Nacionalista Party strengthened popular demand for radical change but the opposition groups were united only in their condemnation of President Marcos. Even the Constitutional Convention, to which the public had placed high hopes to provide solutions to the country's problems, proved to be very disappointing.[91] Like Congress, the Convention's work had been delayed by power struggles for its presidency and disputes on committee organization (which took three months to resolve); frequent lack of quorums in committees, time-consuming rhetoric, and various procedural problems. News of these events and of lavish allowances for delegates led to erosion of public confidence in the Convention.[92]

By the middle of 1972, the protest movement had involved all the centers of political power and did not spare the courts. Two Supreme Court decisions in August 1972 were in accord with demands made by nationalists for an end to parity rights.[93] These decisions were hailed by some opposition leaders and made American businessmen uncertain about the future of their investments. The government's strategy of attracting foreign investments for its economic development program was threatened.

The timing of the Supreme Court decisions was critical as the country was on the brink of economic collapse. Floods had ravaged Manila and Central Luzon in July-August 1972, devastating rice-producing areas and destroying infrastructure and private property. Food shortage aggravated inflation. Manila and other areas of the country were in the grip of fear and lawlessness. As the local police and armed forces were unable to maintain law and order, particularly in Central Luzon, local political leaders strengthened their own private armies; the New People's Army was gaining strength and Muslim dissidents in the South battled with government forces. The specter of anarchy loomed. On September 21, 1972 President Marcos declared martial law and ruled the country with the aid of the military.

The Constitutional Convention continued its work during the martial law administration and in January 1973, a new Constitution was finally approved and ratified by Citizens Assemblies in the country. The new Constitution replaced Congress with a unicameral National Assembly. Thus the martial law regime marked the end of Congress as the Philippine legislature.

Summary and Concluding Observations

The decade before Martial Law witnessed the failure of Congress to enact necessary legislation to solve mounting socioeconomic problems. This political stalemate was the cumulative effect of elite-dominated, clientelist, partisan politics which fostered a lack of direction in national development programs, dissipated much time and government resources for personal electoral ends and perpetuated social divisions. External factors, such as increasing oil prices and accumulating foreign debts, and natural calamities such as the 1972 floods, compounded economic hardships already suffered by the Filipino masses.

Nationalist and other groups demanded radical change in the country's economy and government, including an end to special relations with the United States, but were deeply divided on alternatives and made impotent by factional rivalries. Against this backdrop, President Marcos, with the assistance of technocrats in the executive branch and the military, presented a record of achievement and offered his program of economic development. With the threat of anarchy and economic collapse in 1972 vis-a-vis a Congress incapacitated by factionalism, a Constitutional Convention faced with similar problems, and an intense intra-elite power struggle, it became necessary and possible for President Marcos to declare martial law. In all these events, Metropolitan Manila's problems were highlighted as it became the battleground of opposition groups in the campaign to discredit the Marcos administration and the quest for alternatives to existing political and economic institutions.

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Endnotes

[1]One can, of course, trace the historical origins of Congress much further back to the Malolos Congress during the First Philippine Republic from 1898 to 1899. Some of the original members of the Philippine Assembly had also been previously members of the Malolos Congress. See Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960), chap. 8.

[2]Filipinos were gradually appointed to the Philippine Commission. See Jose M. Aruego, "The Philippine Legislature in Retrospect," in *50 Years of Philippine Autonomy: The Golden Jubilee of the First Philippine Legislature, 1916-1966* (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1966), pp. xxiii.

[3]Philippine Commision, Act No. 82, January 31, 1901.

[4]For illuminating case studies of the development of political parties at the municipal and provincial levels, see Mary R. Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Community Development Research Council, 1963), chap. 3 and Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1972), chap. vii. For insights on the political uses of ritual kinship, see Donn V. Hart, *Compadrinazgo: Ritual Kinship in the Philippines* DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 135-139; 154-158; 182-183; 217-222.

[5]See Bonifacio S. Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901 to 1913* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984), Table 2, p. 57.

[6]See Elsa P. Jurado and Barbara Jo Lava, "Philippine Elections and Political Participation from 1907 to 1971," in Mahar Mangahas, ed., *Measuring Philippine Development: Report of the Social Indicators Project* (Development Academy of the Philippines, 1976), pp. 383-387.

[7]See Dapen Liang, *Philippine Parties and Politics: A Historical Study of National Experience in Democracy* (new ed.; San Francisco, Calif.: The Gladstone Press, 1970), pp. 57-59; William Henry Scott, "The Union Obrera Democratica, First Filipino Labor Union," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. XLVII, Nos. 1-4 (January-December 1983), pp. 131-192.

[8]Liang, *op. cit.*, chaps. V-VI; Onofre D. Corpus, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), esp. chaps. 3-5.

[9]Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1942), pp. 376-377; Francis Burton Harrison, *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), p. 224; Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Corp., 1975), chap. VI.

[10]Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68, 91.

[11]Aruego, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 25-26.

[12]Salamanca, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[13]Conrado Benitez, quoted in Hayden, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[14]Hayden, *ibid.*, pp. 299-308; Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-234.

[15]Hayden, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-23, 293, 378-384; Constantino, *op. cit.*, chap. XVII; David O.D. Wurfel, "The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid," (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, February 1960), pp. 293-296; Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., "An Irrepressible Revolution: The Decline and Resurgence of the Philippine Communist Movement," Distinguished Scholar on Southeast Asia Lecture, University of Hawaii (Honolulu, November 1984), pp. 5-18.

[16]Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), chap. IX; David Wurfel, "The Philippines," in George McTurnan Kahin, ed., *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (2nd ed., Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 692-695; Frank H. Golay, "The Philippine Economy," in George M. Guthrie, ed., *Six Perspectives on the Philippines* (Manila: Bookmark, 1968), pp. 203-205, 224-227.

[17]Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy* (AEI-Hoover Policy Series; 23; Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 13.

[18]Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1935, as amended in 1940 and 1946, Art. VI, Sec. 5.

[19]Maria Elena Gamboa and Raul P. de Guzman, "The Redistricting Bill of 1961," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (henceforth to be cited as *PJPA)*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 1963), pp. 11-26.

[20]Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1935, as amended, Art. VI, Secs. 11 and 13.

[21]*Ibid.*, Art. VI, Secs. 12 and 13.

[22]*Ibid.*, Art. VII, Sec. 10(3) and Art. VIII, Sec. 5.

[23]Republic of the Philippines, Congress, "Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments (As amended in 1968)," in *Those in Favor: A Portrait of the Commission on Appointments* (Manila: Pyramid Ventures Co., 1970), pp. 233-253.

[24]For more on this controversy, see Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York: A.A. Wyn, Inc., 1946); Cheryl Ann Payer, "Exchange Controls and National Capitalism: The Philippine Experience," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. III, No. 1 (1973), pp. 55-56; Renato Constantino and Letizia Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), pp. 204-206; Stephen R. Shalom, "Philippine Acceptance of the Bell Trade Act of 1946: A Study of Manipulatory Democracy," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (August 1980), pp. 499-517.

[25]See Republic Act No. 180, the Revised Election Code of 1947, Sec. 76.

[26]For more on the unsuccessful attempts to organize third parties, see Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 309, 323-324; Carl Lande, "Brief History of Political Parties," in Jose V. Abueva and Raul P. de Guzman, eds., *Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics* (Manila: Bookmark, 1969), pp. 152-154.

[27]Two notable examples of party switching were those of Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Senator Ferdinand Marcos in 1964. Both left the Liberal Party to become the winning presidential candidates of the opposition Nacionalista. See Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-323, 383-388. See also Carl Lande, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics* (monograph Series No. 6; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1964); Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 143-156.

[28]The importance of clientelist relations in elections may be inferred from statistics on voting turnout. From 1946 to 1965, the mean turnout during local elections was higher (81.9 percent of registered voters) than during President elections (76.8 percent). The turnout was also higher in province or rural areas (79.8 percent than in cities (72.5 percent).
These suggest that voters were motivated to go to the polls largely because of personal obligations to political leaders and local rather than national issues. See Hirofumi Ando, "Voting turnout in the Philippines," *PJPA*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (October 1969), pp. 424-441.

[29]James C. Scott has pointed out that these changes "may have assisted the vertical integration of patron-client pyramids," but "they tended to reduce the universality of coverage." Moreover, "patron-client ties have tended to become more instrumental, less comprehensive and hence less resilient." See his "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in Steffen W. Schmidt *et al.*, *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 123-146. The quotation are from p. 138.

[30]Former President Diosdado Macapagal, for example, revealed in an interview that when he ran for the presidency in 1961, the "'export groups' contributed substantial amounts in the hope that he would approve decontrol of the peso, which he did. Industrial groups opposed decontrol for it would mean increased costs of importing raw materials." See David F. Roth, "Towards a Theory of Philippine Presidential Election Politics," *PJPA*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (January 1969), p. 40.

[31]For estimates of rising election expenditures from 1946 to 1961, see David Wurfel, "The Philippines," *The Journal of Politics* (Special Issue on Political Finance), Vol. XXV, No. 3 (August 1963), pp. 757-773.

[32]See Jose V. Abueva, "Social Backgrounds and Recruitment on Legislators and Administrators," in Abueva and de Guzman, eds., *op. cit.*, Table 5, p. 273.

[33]Robert B. Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress: Causes of Structural Change* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1975), Table 7, p. 26.

[34]In 1946, Congress passed 10 local or particularistic bills and 85 national or universalistic bills; in 1950, 61 local and 108 national bills; in 1954, 105 local and 125 national bills; in 1958, 4 local and 40 national bills; in 1962, 36 and 25 respectively; in 1966, 141 and 81 respectively; and in 1970, 30 and 12 respectively. Data are from Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record*, Senate and the House of Representatives, First to Seventh Congress, 1950-1971, *passim*.

[35]For example, original provisions for taxation of agricultural lands were deleted in the final version of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (Republic Act No. 3844). These had been intended to encourage disposition of idle lands in favor of the government and to channel agricultural capital for industrialization. See Concordia G. Palacios, "Financing the Land Reform Program," *PJPA*, Vol. X, No. 1 (January 1966), p. 23. The omitted Chapter IX of H. No. 5222, proposed Land Reform Act of the Philippines, is in Jose D. Soberano and H. Odell Waldby, eds., *Philippine Public Fiscal Administration (Readings and Documents)* (Manila: Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1965), pp. 319-320.

[36]Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress*, pp. 20-21.

[37]The rebellion reached its peak in 1949-1951. For more on the DA, Huks, PKP and peasant unrest, see *The Peasant War in the Philippines: A Study of the Causes of Social Unrest in the Philippines — An Analysis of Philippine Political Economy* (Manila: 1946), reprinted in *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 2-4 (June-December 1958), pp. 374-436; Constantino and Constantino, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-147, 182-188, chap. VIII; William Pomeroy, *An American Made Tragedy: Neo-*

colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1974), pp. 79-84 and his "Review Article: The Philippine Peasantry and the Huk Revolt," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. V, No. 4 (July 1978), pp. 497-517; Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), esp. chap. 7; Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), esp. chaps. 3-4; Norman Lorimer, "Philippine Communism — A Historical Overview," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. VII, No. 4 (1977), pp. 462-485.

[38]See Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), esp. chaps. XIV to XXII; Wurfel, "The Bell Report and After," pp. 440-442.

[39]See Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Office of the Coordinator of Research, University of the Philippines, 1962).

[40]Wurfel, "The Bell Report and After," pp. 3, 274; Abueva, *op. cit.*, pp. 356, 378, 437.

[41] Metropolitan Manila Area has, since November 1975, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 824, been integrated under one government, i.e., the Metropolitan Manila Commission. It is made up of 4 cities — Manila, Caloocan, Pasay and Quezon City — and 13 municipalities — Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati, Las Pinas, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig and Valenzuela.

[42]For more on Manila's problems, see Manuel A. Caoili, "The Government of Metropolitan Manila: Metropolitan Reorganization in a Developing Country" (Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University in Kingston, Canada, 1982), chap. III.

[43]During election years 1961, 1965 and 1969, the number of voters in Manila and Quezon City made up about six percent of the nation's total. See Metro Manila Research team, *Restructuring Government in Metropolitan Manila* (Manila: Local Government Center, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, March 1973), pp. 85-86.

[44]President Carlos Garcia's defeat in the 1961 elections, for instance, was partly attributed to Mayor Arsenio Lacson's active campaigning for Liberal Party candidate Diosdado Macapagal, despite the fact that both the President and the Mayor belonged to the Nacionalista Party. See Martin Meadows, "Philippine Political Parties and the 1961 Election," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (Fall 1962), pp. 261-274.

[45]Leonardo C. Mariano, "Congress and Local Autonomy," *PJPA*, Vol. I, No. 4 (October 1957), p. 364.

[46]*Ibid.*, pp. 366-375.

[47]See Proserpina D. Tapales, "Philippine Cities: Government Partners or Parasites?," *PJPA*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 67-76.

[48]Leonardo C. Mariano, "Local Government Finance," in Abueva and de Guzman, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

[49]As A.B. Villanueva observed: "The struggle for local autonomy was not only a fight for greater local powers. More importantly, it was a battle between legislative and executives elites for the control of local government." See his "Elite Choices and Constitutional Guarantees of Local Autonomy in the Third World: The Case of the Philippines, 1971-73," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. XIV, Part 3 (July 1980), p. 492.

[50]Pork barrel funds were allocated evenly to Senators and Representatives regardless of size of their province or district. Each legislator was given full discretion on projects in his district to be undertaken under the Public Works Act. See Gerardo M. Roxas, "The Pork Barrel System," PJPA, Vol. VII, No. 4 (October 1963), pp. 254-257, Ledivina C. Vidallon, "Pork Barrel Financing," *PJPA*, Vol. X, No. 1 (January 1966), pp. 29-38.

[51]One study observed that over a seven-year period, total appropriations authorized in public works acts amounted to ₱1.5 billion but only ₱652,273,045 (43.5 percent) was actually released. See Nestor N. Pilar, Tito C. Firmalino and Arturo G. Pacho, "The Administration of the Public Highways Program," *PJPA*, Vol. X, Nos. 2-3 (April-July 1966), p. 172.

[52]John J. Carroll, S.J., *The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent and Product of Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 100.

[53]Dante C. Simbulan, "A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Philippine Politics and Government, 1946-1963," Ph. D. dissertation, Australia National University, 1965), pp. 105-111.

[54]*Ibid.*, pp. 295, 369. The number of public officials or relatives of officials on corporate boards provides evidence of the close association between economic and political power. Simbulan found that 33 private commercial banks in 1963, 88 percent of them had public officials or their close relatives on their boards of directors.

[55]Golay, "The Philippine Economy," p. 252.

[56]These allowances were in addition to the regular salaries of Representatives and formed part of the Speaker's discretionary fund. In the Senate, these were called "allotments." Allowances for Representatives rose from ₱3,000 each in 1954 to an estimated ₱250,000 each in 1964-65. For details, see Jose D. Soberano, "Executive-Legislative Fiscal Relations: 'The Illegal' Allowances of Congressmen and the 'Qualified Veto'," in Soberano and Waldby, *op. cit.*, pp. 540-547.

[57]Joseph W. Dodd, "The Consequences of the Legislature in Developing Societies: The Case of the Philippines," *Asian Profile*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (February 1978), Table 1, p. 46, and his "Legislative Adaptability in Developing Areas: The Case of the Philippine Congress," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVI, No. 7 (July 1976), Table 2, p. 643.

[58]See Ma. Concepcion T. Parroco, "Congressional Timetable in Budget Legislation, 1964-1971," *PJPA*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (April 1972), pp. 170-185.

[59]*Ibid.*, p. 170. The President was required by the Constitution to submit within 15 days of the opening of each regular session of Congress (which began on the fourth Monday of January) a budget of receipts and expenditures which was the basis for the general appropriations bill. *See Constitution of the Philippines* (1935), Article VI, Secs. 9, 19. The fiscal year started on 1 July and ended on 30 June of the following year.

[60]Parroco, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

[61]*Ibid.*, pp. 180-183. The President had a wide latitude in disbursing these funds.

[62]See Remigio E. Agpalo, "The Roles of Legislators in the Philippine Political System," *Philippine Political Science Journal*, No. 4 (December 1976). Tables 1 and 2, p. 48. Visitors of legislators were usually constituents seeking legal, medical or other personal services; contributions to *barrio* or town *fiestas*; recommendations for jobs, promotions and other favors. Asked what were their problems as legislators, 55.6 percent of Senators and 79.2 percent of Representatives responded that they had to take care of too many jobseekers. *Ibid.*, p. 52. The interviews covered 77 Representatives (74 percent of total) and 18 Senators (75 percent of total). For an illuminating case study on patron-

age, see Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr. and Raul P. de Guzman, "The 50-50 Agreement," in Raul P. de Guzman, ed., *Patterns in Decision-Making, Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration* (Manila: Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1963), pp. 91-120.

[63]Stauffer in *The Philippine Congress,* (p. 22) quotes a staff report written for the *Ad Hoc* Committee on House Reforms in 1972, which evaluated the first two sessions of the Seventh Congress (1970 and 1971): "Out of 200 session days, the House was able to meet for only 116 days or only 58 percent of the session days alloted by the Constitution; . . . 10,296 man days (out of 21,200) were lost due to combined absences and failure of the House to meet."

[64]See Lorenzo Sumulong, "Reorganizing the Congress," in Jose Veloso Abueva, ed., *Perspective in Government Reorganization* (Manila: College of Public Administation, University of the Philippines, 1969), pp. 425-433; Caridad S. Alfonso, "Some Notes on Legislative Committees in the House of Representatives," *PJPA,* Vol. XIV, No. 3 (July 1970), pp. 236-258.

[65]See Jose B. Laurel, Jr., *Report on the National Economy* (Manila: Lyceum Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 144-147; and "Congressional Economic Planning Office," (Pamphlet), 4 pp.

[66]Caridad A. Semaña, "Philippine Politics and Economic Development,"*PJPA,* Vol. XI, No. 1 (January 1967), pp. 32-33.

[67]Cornelio T. Villareal, *Record of the House in the Fifth Congress, 1962-1965: A Report to the People* (Manila: House of Representatives, 1965), p. 7.

[68]For example, Styskal found "substantial" distrust of politicians among his interviewees belonging to the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Chinese respondents frequently stated that Congressmen were more "lawbreakers" than "lawmakers" (p. 249). Similar statements were made by Filipino businessmen. These were in contrast to the legislators' expressed support for interest group activities. See Richard A. Styskal, "Some aspects of Group Representation in the Philippine Congress," in G.R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim, eds., *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 233-260. For results of a survey of high school students in 1964 in the Greater Manila Area, see Loretta M. Sicat, "The (Fair Hope of the Fatherland)" Take a Look at Politics in the Old Society'," *PJPA,* Vol. XVII, No. (October 1973), pp. 437-465.

[69]See Romeo B. Ocampo, "Social Justice: An Essay on Philippine Social Ideology," *PJPA,* Vol. XV, Nos. 3-4 (July-October 1971), p. 291. The Resolution is reprinted in Jose V. Abueva, ed., *Filipino Politics, Nationalism and Emerging Ideologies: Background for Constitution-Making* (Manila: The Modern Book Co., 1972).

[70]Roth, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

[71]For details on the RCPPC's operations and accomplishments, see Raul P. de Guzman, "Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Rice: A Study of the Philippine experience in Program Implementation," *PJPA,* Vol. IV, No. 2 (April 1970), pp. 136-166; Albina Manalo-Dans, "The Coordinating Councils: Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council and the Infrastructure Operations Center," in Abueva, *Perspectives in Government Reorganization,* pp. 291-305.

[72]Quoted in Rafael M. Salas, "Administrative Aspects of Philippine Economic Development," *PJPA,* Vol. XII, No. 1 (January 1968), p. 34. Salas served as Executive Secretary of President Marcos from 1965 to 1969.

[73]For details, see Quintin R. de Borja, Armando M. Gatmaitan and Gregorio C. de Castro, "Notes on the Role of the Military in Socio-Economic Development," *PJPA*, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July 1968), pp. 266-283. The Four-Year Economic Program for the Philippines, Fiscal Years 1967-1970, devoted one of its six chapters to the role of the AFP.

[74]On the rise of technocrats, their background and philosophy, see Romeo B. Ocampo, "Technocrats and Planning: Sketch and Exploration," *PJPA*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 31-64.

[75]de Guzman, "Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Rice," pp. 161-162.

[76]de Borja, Gatmaitan and de Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

[77]Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[78]For an attempt to measure relationships between social and economic change, intra-elite competition and changing patron-client relations and their consequences in electoral costs and violence in cities, see Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder, "Economic Concentration and Political Change in the Philippines," Benedict J. Kerkvliet, ed., *Political Change in the Philippines: Studies of Local Politics Preceding Martial Law* (Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 14; Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), pp. 152-241.

[79]Guss, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63; Robert B. Stauffer, "Philippine Authoritarianism: Framework for Peripheral 'Development', " *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 3 (Fall 1977), pp. 368-373.

[80]For a general consideration of the consequences of this phenomenon, see Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 120-167; and his "Administrative Reform as a Problem in Dynamic Balancing," *PJPA*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (April 1970), pp. 101-135.

[81]Jose V. Abueva, "The Philippines: Tradition and Change," *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No. 1 (January 1970), pp. 56-57.

[82]For details on these incidents and an analysis of the political goals and composition of participating student organizations, see J.C. Rivera, "The Student-Revolt and Local Governments," *Local Government Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January-February 1970), pp. 7, 13, 16. See also Robert O. Tilman, "The Philippines in 1970: A Difficult Decade Begins," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February 1971), pp. 139-144.

[83]Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Development: A Philippine Note," *PJPA*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (April 1972), p. 132, cites a report by the *Manila Times* Banking Supplement (October 29, 1971), p. 10 which showed that by "1970 the Philippines owed a total of US$1.96 billion to some 25 nations and international institutions and would have had to pay $480 million a year in interest and amortization payments had not a major 'restructuring' of the debt been negotiated. Had the $480 million been paid, it would have represented 33 percent of expected receipts from exports of goods and services for 1970."

[84]For details and analysis of government-media relations before Martial Law, see David A. Rosenberg, "Liberty versus Loyalty: The Transformation of Philippine News Media Under Martial Law," in D.A. Rosenberg, ed., *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 151-160.

[85]See Republic Act No. 6132. Constitutional Convention Law, August 24, 1970; Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress*, p. 34; John H. Adkins, "Philippines 1971: Events of a Year, Trends of the Future," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January 1972), p. 80.

[86]Tilman, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[87]See Alejandro Lichauco, *The Lichauco Paper: Imperialism in the Philippines* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

[88]Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Development," pp. 135-136.

[89]For details, see Lichauco, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-80.

[90]See W. Scott Thompson, *Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States, 1965-1975* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 138-139.

[91]Vicenta C. Rimando, "Con-Con-After Nine Months," *Local Government Bulletin*, Vol. VII No. 1 (January-February 1972), p. 6.

[92]By February 1972, the Convention had spent some ₱19 million and was requesting an additional outlay of ₱41.6 million to cover its expenses from July to December 1972. See *ibid.*, p. 7.

[93]Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of a Coup: Transnational Linkages and Philippine Political Response," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. XI (1974), pp. 170-171.